The Demand Side of Rebel Governance

• In Event: Rebel Governance, Legitimacy, and Civilian Behavior

Abstract

The burgeoning literature on rebel governance has overwhelmingly focused on the supply side of insurgent public goods provision. Comparatively less has been written on the demand side of rebel governance. Yet, the organization of local affairs across many civil wars indicates that the nature of insurgent rule is shaped by a combination of rebel incentives and civilian preferences. Rather than passive actors caught in the maelstrom of violence, civilians can display considerable agency and can fundamentally affect the fabric of insurgent control. In this paper, we explore theoretically the demand side of rebel governance and develop a typology that captures the most common factors shaping civilian preferences for extensive or more limited rebel rule. Specifically, we argue that demand for rebel governance is likely to be greater when the central government is discriminatory/repressive and when (in)formal institutional legacies regarding state penetration of society, customary authority, and non-statal forms of political organization are present. We illustrate these processes with four cases: Kosovo, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, and Burma/Myanmar. Our study is relevant not only for grasping the fragmentation of authority during civil wars but also for ongoing efforts at empirically capturing the nature of rebel rule.

Authors

• Romain Malejacq, Radboud University Nijmegen

• Adrian Florea, University of Glasgow