The Impact of Bipartisan Voting Coalitions on Congressional Override Rates

• In Event: Independence and Influence in Federal Judicial Decisionmaking

Abstract

This paper explores the impact of bipartisan voting coalitions on the Supreme Court on congressional override rates. Literature on congressional overrides of Supreme Court decisions identifies several factors that seem to be associated with congressional overrides. These factors include 5-4 decisions, salient cases, polarization, case area, narrowing of federal regulations, and invitations to congress to override (Hasen 2013, Christiansen and Eskridge 2014). The paper will explore if the bipartisan voting coalitions on the Supreme Court are a signal to Congress that there is some ambiguity regarding the case. For the bipartisan coalitions to exist, the case must be split (non 9-0) and there must be at least one justice who votes with the justices on the other side of the political spectrum. In split decisions, there is often a clear liberal-conservative divide regarding the vote. However, there are cases where we see a conservative justice join the liberal block or a liberal justice join the conservative block. The bipartisan voting coalitions may occur for several reasons such as the issue area, technicalities, or current ideological scales do not properly identify the dimensions of the issue. If the cases are a signal of ambiguity that extends beyond the traditional left-right spectrum ,then cases with bipartisan coalitions may be more likely to be overridden by Congress. In order to identify if there is a relationship between the composition of the Supreme Court voting coalitions and congressional overrides, the paper relies on three major data sources: The Supreme Court Database ( Spaeth, Epstein, et al. 2018), Martin-Quinn Scores, and data on congressional overrides (Hasen 2013, Christiansen and Eskridge 2014). The data consists of all Supreme Court cases from 1937-2017. Using Martin-Quinn scores (Martin and Quinn, 2002), the data estimates the ideological order of the justices. Given that all voting coalitions may not be equal, the data consists of three separate types of bipartisan voting coalitions. The first variable includes the swing vote. The Swing Vote variable accounts for all instances where the middle justice swings to join the other coalition. The second variable is the Leap-Frog variable. The Leap-Frog variable measures instances where justices jump over other justices on the ideological spectrum to join the other coalition. Lastly, the final variable includes the poles. The Poles variable consists of all instances when the justices on the furthest ends of the spectrum vote with the other block. If the hypothesis is correct, and bipartisan voting coalitions are more likely to be overridden by congress, then it raises more questions regarding the internal decision making on the Court. Overall, the project will provide insight regarding the impact of the composition of Supreme Court voting coalitions on their interactions with congress.

Author

• Jessica Lyne Kehler, Temple University