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What explains the emergence of robust revolutionary rebel groups? In this paper, we argue that patterns of colonial rule determine both the emergence and success of revolutionary rebel groups. Revolutionary rebel groups were more likely to emerge within and be successful under conditions of direct colonial rule. Direct colonial rule incubated networks of revolutionaries that spread and transferred strategies, ideas, resources and matériel. These networks raised the organizational, political and military capacity of rebel groups. Direct rule colonies also created the structural conditions that favored revolutionary rebel mobilization through the visibly uneven distribution of state resources and justice between the colonized and colonizing population. The unevenness in the distribution of resources fostered a unified sense of resentment amongst the colonized population that made colonized populations more receptive to rebel ideologies and mobilization efforts. At the same time, relatively higher investments in transportation and infrastructure under direct rule colonies, in comparison to indirectly ruled colonies, enabled rebels to more easily and quickly spread across the colony. Indirect rule, in contrast, fostered neither the networks nor the structural conditions under which revolutionary rebel groups are more likely to emerge and thrive. We test our theory with quantitative data on colonial rule and with three case studies on the Viet Minh, the Malayan Communist Party and the Thai Communist Party. Results are consistent with expectations and have implications for understanding the consequences of statebuilding and colonizing projects, as well as the causes of rebel group emergence and success. We conclude with a discussion of how our theoretical framework applies to contemporary jihadist revolutionary rebel groups.