The Vote of Confidence Procedure and Policy Bargaining

• In Event: Bargaining and Policy-making in Multiparty Governments

Abstract

The confidence relationship between government and parliament is foundational of parliamentary democracy, yet the precise nature of confidence procedure varies tremendously with consequences for the relative power of governing parties vis-a-vis their peers. This paper examines the consequences of this institutional variation for public policy. Specifically, we explore whether dominant parties with extensive powers to impose penalties on other parties though the vote of confidence are able to extract greater concessions from their coalition partners in policy bargaining than their peers who lack such powers. Employing data on the policy positions of government parties, the allocation of ministerial portfolios, and policy outcomes on welfare spending, we find that the Prime Minister’s party is able to extract considerable concessions and implement its preferred policy positions to the extent that the institutional provisions allow the PM to dissolve parliament and call early elections. These results add to our understanding of policy-making in multiparty governments and has implications for existing and future research on coalition governance.

Authors

• Hanna Back, Lund University

• Alejandro Ecker

• Petra Schleiter, University of Oxford