Search
Browse By Day
Browse By Time
Browse By Person
Browse By Mini-Conference
Browse By Division
Browse By Session or Event Type
Search Tips
Virtual Exhibit Hall
Personal Schedule
Sign In
X (Twitter)
Political science has long held conventional expectations about the effectiveness of different government types in the policy making process. Ceteris paribus, single-party majority governments are thought to be most effective in introducing policy change, followed by single-party minority and majority coalition governments, where individual parties have to either bargain with opposition parties or coalition partners to make changes to the status quo. The highest bargaining costs – and thus the lowest levels of reform effectiveness – are expected for minority coalition governments. Using a unique data set on economic and social reform measures in Western European countries, we find that differences in the level of reform output between these government types are primarily due to time constraints, since minority and coalition governments have, on average, a shorter survival time in office. Yet we also find that single-party governments are the most effective in implementing their desired policy agenda, especially compared to minority coalitions. These findings suggest that government types have nuanced but important implications for the policy making process.