The Politics of Parliamentary Accountability in Africa

• In Event: African Legislatures and Horizontal Accountability

Abstract

Most state constitutions provide for unilateral executive rule-making – either through presidential decrees or subsidiary lawmaking sanctioned by primary legislation. However, the incidence of executive rule-making often reflects the outcomes of inter-branch bargaining relationships. This paper examines the differential changes in the incidence of executive rule-making in Kenya and Zambia following the end of single party rule in both countries in the early 1990s. The end of single party rule nominally empowered the legislatures in the two countries and was accompanied by a marked decline of executive rule-making in both countries. However, the decline in presidential rulemaking was driven by different factors in the two countries. In Kenya, it reflected legislative empowerment and ability to curtail unilateral executive action; while in Zambia it merely signaled a shift in the domain of unilateral executive action. These findings have implications for our understanding of the sources and measures of horizontal accountability in emerging democracies.

Author

• Ken Ochieng' Opalo, Georgetown University