Mutual Knowledge Rationality among International Policy Elites

• In Event: Disaggregating the State: Leaders, Policy Elites and Small Groups in IR

Abstract

In game theoretic experiments, the predictions made by Nash equilibrium sometimes fail, either because players choose irrational strategies or lack mutual knowledge of each other’s rationality. However, when game theoretic experiments are used to study international interactions, researchers worry that decision-making differs between international policymakers and the convenience samples typically used in behavioral experiments. If so, the results of experiments using convenience samples may not generalize to decision-making by elite policymakers. In this research note, I examine whether international policy elites exhibit behavior that is consistent with both rationality and mutual knowledge rationality across a set of games. I find that, unlike convenience sample subjects, a high percentage of elites consistently act as if they are rational. However, very few elites consistently act as if they believe that all other elites are rational as well. So, when experimental results are driven by a lack of mutual knowledge rationality, the results may also apply to strategic decision-making by international policy elites.

Author

• Brad L. LeVeck, University of California, Merced