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Ex-rebel commanders play a central role in peacebuilding after civil war, often deciding where governments consolidate authority and whether states relapse into violence. Yet the influence and mobilization power of these actors is not uniform: in some areas commanders retain strong social ties to civilian populations after integrating into the state, while in other areas such ties wither away. What accounts for this variation? This article advances a theory of local goods provision and political accountability to explain why commander-community linkages endure or decline after post-conflict transitions. Drawing on multiple data sources from the Ivory Coast, including an original survey of community informants in former rebel-occupied regions, it shows that commanders retained social capital and access to networks of supporters in areas where insurgents provided essential goods to civilians during war. By contrast, where insurgents' wartime rule involved physical abuse, coercion, and predatory taxation, ex-rebel commanders were less likely to sustain influence and mobilization power. These findings challenge conventional wisdom about why armed group leaders remain powerful political brokers in peacetime. They also suggest that effective governance may help armed movements build support and win civil wars, but also create regionally-embedded strongmen who are able to resist centralized statebuilding.