A Theory of Individual-Level Partisanship in Congress

• In Event: Poster Session: Legislative Studies

Abstract

This paper develops a novel theory of partisan behavior in Congress. I argue that individual-level partisanship is principally driven by two factors: opportunities to bicker with the opposition within Congress and electoral motives. Members do not fight with the opposition on any issue; they focus on partisan battles on which they possess expertise and jurisdiction. This allows members to speak credibly to a partisan audience and creates a coordinating heuristic in which copartisans avoid drowning out each other’s messaging. Additionally, members only act in a partisan manner when they stand to gain electorally. Absent an attentive partisan constituency, legislators will choose not to bicker with the opposition. I test my theory by analyzing every tweet Senators during the hyper-partisan Brett Kavanaugh confirmation hearings. By studying Senators during the entire confirmation process, as well as before and after the unexpected sexual assault allegations, I find support for my theory. Members with clear opportunities and electoral motives engaged in partisan messaging at much higher rates than their colleagues. Moreover, a Senator’s ideology is not associated with their partisan behavior. This study revises conventional views about why partisanship in Congress arises, explains why some legislators are more partisan than others, and reveals the circumstances in which lawmakers are willing to fight with their opponents.

Author

• Jeremy Gelman, University of Nevada, Reno