Urbanization, Land seizure, and Welfare Provision in China

• In Event: Social Welfare Provision in Non-democracies: Evidence from China

Abstract

In recent years, non-employment-based welfare programs have expanded rapidly in China. The coverage of the urban and rural residency-based pension program has increased dramatically especially in the economically less-developed Chinese inland provinces. The coverage of the minimum livelihood guarantee program has also expanded widely. With these changes, those who have been excluded from the employment-based welfare regime, the unemployed and informal workers, have not gained an access to welfare programs. What explains the expansion of the non-employment-based welfare programs in an authoritarian country where state actors are insulated from the constituents’ bottom-up welfare demands? Why and when do Chinese state actors develop the welfare programs that embrace those who have little labor market power? I argue that Chinese local state actors develop non-employment-based welfare programs to compensate rural residents from whom local states seize land. For many rural residents, the land is the last resort of their social security. When these rural residents cannot be absorbed in the formal labor market, Chinese local state actors compensate them with non-employment-based welfare benefits in exchange for their lands. The expansion of non-employment-based welfare programs is jointly explained by the level of labor informality and land seizure. I test the central argument of this research project using the city-level panel data and individual-level survey data.

Author

• Yujeong Yang, State University of New York, Cortland