From Preferences to Performance: Explaining Variation in Peacekeeper Behavior

• In Event: Peacekeeping

Abstract

Do motives matter for performance? Previous research has shown that states contribute to peacekeeping operations for different reasons. Yet, research so far has not analyzed whether different interests translate into variation in behavior on the ground. Here, I present a concise theoretical argument to explain baseline variation in peacekeeper performance. I posit that contributors who benefit from mission success will perform better than those who benefit primarily from participation. For the former, high performance is compensated for by its direct contribution to the preferred outcome. The latter receiving no additional benefit from either mission outcome will instead shirk to reduce potential costs. To test this conjecture, I collected an original dataset on violent incidences during the Somalia operation in the 90s using archived daily intelligence reports. A Bayesian multilevel model is used to provide some evidence that variation in motives can predict variation in response rates to violent attacks. Contributors with greater security or economic interests in Somalia generally performed better. While tentative, these results suggest that mission success is also a function of the political will rather than mere material capacity.

Author

• Merlin Heidemanns, Columbia University