Institutional Design, Information Transmission, and Public Opinion

• In Event: Analyzing the Micro-foundations of the Anti-Trade Backlash

Abstract

Increasing anti-trade and anti-globalization attitudes among the mass public are undermining support for economic cooperation, raising the question of whether, and how, domestic support can be rallied in support of international trade agreements. We argue that IOs can send important cues to domestic audiences that shape public support for international trade agreements. When trade deals are negotiated multilaterally, institutional characteristics of IOs, specifically the membership of the participants and the voting rules, provide information to the public that affects support for proposed deals. We use a survey experiment to show that the US public is more supportive of trade when it is negotiated through an IO with a biased membership -- composed of like-minded countries -- and when the US has veto power. We also find that these traits have differential effects among partisan audiences, and that right-wing voters strongly favor agreements when the US has veto power in the negotiations. Our findings suggest that such institutional characteristics alleviate domestic concerns about trade agreements and play a significant role in rallying support, especially among Republican members of the public.

Authors

• Ryan Brutger, University of Pennsylvania

• Siyao Li, University of Pennsylvania