How International Actors Help Enforce Domestic Deals

• In Event: The Politics of Non-State Governance and Control in Fragile States

Abstract

This paper examines how international actors help enforce political bargains between incumbent governments and their domestic opponents. I argue that opposition parties tend to have trouble trusting the incumbent to adhere to a political bargain over time, extending beyond well-known disarmament problems in post-conflict contexts. A set of commitment or “reversion” problems occurs when incumbents can use their asymmetric hold on power and familiarity with state institutions to violate terms and maintain more of the status quo than agreed. Such problems can be overcome when international actors use elections to obtain information about violations, and then condition incentives such as foreign aid on compliance. The role of international actors is crucial and additional study of the conditions under which domestic actors can expect such scrutiny would advance this research agenda. Case illustrations of implementing peace agreements, transitioning toward more open democracy, increasing electoral integrity, and protecting human rights, help identify reversion problems, theorize how international actors can help avoid reversion, and explore when their intervention is likely to work.

Author

• Aila M. Matanock, University of California-Berkeley