The Effectiveness of US Economic Aid in Nuclear Nonproliferation

• In Event: Poster Session: International Security II

Abstract

Can economic aid inhibit a target state’s nuclear weapons proliferation ambition? I have sought to extend scholarly thinking on positive inducements in international relations by examining the effectiveness of U.S. economic aid in nuclear nonproliferation. In this paper, I examine the effects of U.S. bilateral aid on nuclear nonproliferation (measured by nuclear latency) through a large-N statistical analysis at the aggregate level. I find that U.S. bilateral aid can indeed positively induce potential proliferators to curb its nuclear ambitions. My findings have important implications for both scholars in the field and policymakers alike: Positive inducements need much more attention as strategic instruments of foreign policy – at least as much negative incentives (e.g. sanctions) have received – than they have been given thus far. A more nuanced understanding of the effectiveness of positive inducements could help further the global nonproliferation regime’s agenda and contribute to a more secure international community.

Author

• So Jin Lee