Interest Group Influence on Subordinate Policies

• In Event: Interest Group Access and Influence

Abstract

Interest Group Influence on Subordinate Policies

This paper examines the mechanisms by which interest groups influence “subordinate policies,” the specific provisions embedded in or omitted from legislation that is adopted on the basis of its one-dimensional appeal to chamber majorities. The theory suggests, first, that interest group success at this level will depend on the bill-specific access groups get to legislative allies on the committee of jurisdiction, and, second, that that relationship will be increasing in the degree of interest group-majority party policy alignment. The data come from interviews with interest group lobbyists in which they were asked about their clients' priorities and preferences with respect to a list of specific provisions considered for inclusion in two bills, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 and the Student Success Act of 2015. We use these data to test whether lobbying allies, by the group and groups on its side, is related to success at the subordinate policy level, and whether that relationship is conditional on party alignment and counteractive lobbying. We also test whether success is related to lobbying legislators near the committee or floor pivot.

Author

• Richard L. Hall, University of Michigan