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Why, in authoritarian settings, do some unions choose to engage in politically motivated protests while others do not? Drawing on an original dataset of labor protest, this paper attempts to explain this puzzling heterogeneity from an institutional perspective. Using evidence from thirteen Middle Eastern countries over the period 1980-2011, I test the relative impact of institutions against competing explanations for labor behavior which focus on the effects of repression, grievances, and material inducements in affecting patterns of labor mobilization. Challenging the conventional assumption that labor opposition is contingent upon the material benefits received by trade unions, I highlight the impact that institutions, particularly those which structure labor organization and its relationship with the state, have on union decisions to express political demands. Specifically, I find that two key features of labor’s institutional environment —the extent of labor incorporation and union alliances with political parties— are critical variables that affect union’s decision to participate in political protest. Taken together, I argue that these variables capture both the willingness as well as the capacity of unions to engage in political opposition against authoritarian rulers, thereby providing a fuller account of divergence in protest patterns within autocratic states.