The Political Economy of Privileged Networks in Tunisia

• In Event: Old and New Actors in Middle East and North African Politics

Abstract

How does crony capitalism adapt itself to economic liberalization in a non-democratic context? This paper questions the prevailing idea that the monopolistic crony capitalism that emerged under Ben Ali’s authoritarian regime was the result of clientelist mechanisms put in place by the regime or excessive governmental intervention. Drawing on interviews with public officials and economic actors, and a network analysis of more than 250 business-owners close to the regime, this study explains that crony networks emerged as an economically efficient “spontaneous order” through the non-action of the state instead of a deliberate governmental design. The marketization of the economy allowed Ben Ali cronies to accumulate wealth efficiently without having to rely on a centrally controlled hierarchy of resource allocation in the way conventional patron-client systems do. By showing how crony capitalism can flourish efficiently in a liberalized market economy when state regulatory institutions are inhibited by the ruling elite, this paper lays the foundation for a better understanding of the rapid development of politically connected businesses in the informal sector.

Author

• Mohamed-Dhia Hammami