Presidential Constraints on Supreme Court Decision Making

• In Event: Presidents, Courts, and Politics

Abstract

Contrary to prominent arguments that the Supreme Court is unconstrained in its constitutional decision-making when reviewing statutes, scholars have more recently argued that Congress can limit the Court’s use of judicial review with tools that threaten its institutional power and legitimacy, or “court-curbing.” Few studies, however, have empirically examined the role that presidents play in constraining judicial decision-making. This oversight is surprising, given the increasingly important role of the president in implementing and enforcing the law. Using an expanded dataset of all legislation passed between 1948 and 2015, this paper examines the ways in which the president can influence whether and when the Supreme Court decides to review, uphold, or overturn a law. This study finds that the ideology of the president has a significant effect on these decisions. Particularly, it demonstrates that the Court only finds congressional threats influential when Congress and the president are aligned, which is when legislative action is most likely. Furthermore, the evidence demonstrates that presidents can increase the likelihood of judicial review and invalidation through their use of signing statements, which provide a signal to the Court about a law’s constitutionality. Overall, this study demonstrates the ability of presidents to exert power and influence in the judicial arena, whereas most existing studies largely focus on congressional constraints.

Authors

• Sharece Thrower, Vanderbilt University

• Paul J. Gardner, Queen's University