Nationalism, Alliances, and Geopolitics: US-China-Taiwan Ties under Trump and Xi

• In Event: Reunderstanding Cross-Strait Relations: The Status Quo? The One-China Policy?

Abstract

2019 marks the 40th anniversary of the founding of diplomatic relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China and the establishment of a legal framework (under the Taiwan Relations Act) to manage the unofficial relations between the U.S. and Taiwan. Both of these enduring frameworks face new challenges at systemic, interstate, and individual levels. The election of Donald Trump, who campaigned on “making America great again,” as the U.S. president and the consolidation of power as China’s leader without term limits by Xi Jinping, who is committed to bring about “national rejuvenation,” propelled populist nationalism to the forefront of each country’s foreign policy and introduced volatility and unpredictability. While the two powers are jockeying for global leadership under the guise of “trade war,” concerns arise over whether a “transactionalist” president might play the “Taiwan card” to extract concessions from China. Beijing claims Taiwan as a “core interest” that it is willing to defend with force. Xi equated the recovery of the island with “national rejuvenation” in his speech marking the 40th anniversary of “Letter to Taiwan Compatriots,” which inaugurated China’s peaceful unification campaign, The current Taiwanese administration of Tsai Ing-wen, from the historically pro-independence DPP, has refrained from provoking China while rebuffing Beijing’s demand that she accepts the so-called 1992 Consensus (as Beijing defines it). However, the underlying dynamics linking Taiwan’s political development (evolving national identity as a result of democratization) and foreign policy (quest for security and recognition) intrinsically test alliance management.
This paper employs a three-step analytical framework to examine the prospects of U.S.-China-Taiwan relations under Trump, Xi, and Tsai. By identifying the “first move” by Taiwan (changing national identity and quest for recognition because of democratization), the “second move” by China (more forceful policy), and the “third move” by the U.S. (to restore the “status quo”), this framework has successfully explained this triangular relationship from 1996-2016. However, with the rise of populist leader such as Trump and Xi, either could make the first move, with the other making the second move, new uncertainty is introduced that previous policy may be ill-suited to dealt with. This paper engages on certain policy adjustments.

Author

• Vincent Wei-cheng Wang, Adelphi University