The End of the Nuclear Weapons Program: Changing Pathways to a Bomb

• In Event: Nuclear Proliferation

Abstract

While a large literature has theorized about the decision of states to develop nuclear weapons, few scholars examine pathways to a weapon—how states actually go about building a bomb. Analysts have long assumed that states would use undeclared, secret facilities to produce the highly enriched uranium or plutonium necessary for nuclear weapons, but the example of Iran suggests that this assumption may no longer hold. I hypothesize that changes in the behavior of nuclear supplier states and in the multilateral agreements governing the spread of nuclear weapons make would-be proliferants more likely to pursue a latent nuclear capability—acquiring technology that brings them just to the edge of having a nuclear weapon. I test this theory with a medium-n analysis of all past nuclear weapons programs, examining why states chose particular pathways to a bomb. My findings have important implications for our understanding of theories of nuclear proliferation, and for the international community’s efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons technology in the future.

Author

• Jeff Kaplow, William & Mary