Homeowner Representation on City Councils

• In Event: Who Represents Whom in Local Elections

Abstract

Conventional explanations for restrictive land use policies in American cities emphasize the role of homeowners in the political process (e.g. Fischel 2001). Because homeowners have a strong financial incentive to protect local property values, they tend to support policies that restrict the supply of new housing. Evidence from surveys (Hall & Yoder 2018) and experiments (Marble & Nall, 2017) confirm the causal effect of homeownership on policy preferences and political participation.

However, this relationship alone cannot explain the outsized political power of homeowners and the ubiquity of restrictive zoning, particularly in cities with a substantial share of renters. In this paper, we argue that part of the explanation lies in the identity of municipal public office-holders. Combining information from voter files, surveys, and parcel-level tax data, we compile the largest dataset to date on the demographic and economic characteristics of city councilmembers. We find that homeowners are systematically more likely than renters to run for, and win, local public office. In addition, we explore the conditional effect that electoral institutions -- like off-cycle election timing and single-member districts -- have on homeowner representation in city councils.

Author

• Joseph Ornstein, Washington University in St. Louis