Information Transmission in Civil Wars: Conflict Networks and Mediation

• In Event: Complex Interactions in Civil Wars

Abstract

We provide a novel n-player perspective on how information transmission about external actors’ intention to enforce peace agreements leads to the escalation or de-escalation of armed conflicts. Our formal model analyzes how external actors’ signals to intervene can initiate escalation or de-escalation cascades. More specifically, external actors can differ in the extent to which they are expected to enforce peace agreements and how noisy that signal is. Actors update their beliefs about the enforcement type based on the initial signal, but also condition their behavior on the other actors’ interpretation of the signal. Very noisy signals can lead to highly heterogeneous responses in conflict networks, which increase the risk of escalation cascades. We propose that belligerents escalate fighting when they believe a mediator will enforce a potential peace agreement. However, less credible but noisy signals by interveners can also lead to the same escalation dynamics. Using data on intrastate conflicts in Africa for the years 1993-2007 we find support for the proposed escalation patterns.

Authors

• Altaf Ali, University College London

• Nils W. Metternich, University College London

• Tatjana Stankovic, University of Oslo