How Militarized Cyber Technology Affects Interstate Bargaining

• In Event: Empirical Study of Cyberspace Conflict

Abstract

How do military innovations with uncertain battlefield implications affect interstate bargaining dynamics? States that develop additional military capabilities often accrue greater bargaining leverage. This paper studies whether the same is true of new, but largely untested, military capabilities. Cyber weapons exemplify this dynamic as academics, policy-makers assessing adversary cyber capabilities, and even policy-makers possessing cyber capabilities are uncertain of these weapons’ battlefield utility. Absent evidence of their warfare efficacy, we expect cyber capabilities have less effect on assessments of military and bargaining strength compared to conventional capabilities with commonly known battlefield implications. Due to the uncertainty over their utility, costly demonstrations of cyber capabilities induce larger assessment revisions than similar demonstrations of well-understood conventional weapons. We test these predictions with a survey experiment administered to a sample consisting of military and civilian professionals with occupational expertise in cyber planning and operations. Generating causal estimates from an elite sample, the study illustrates whether and under what conditions military innovations yield coercive advantages in interstate bargaining.

Authors

• Heidi Demarest, US Military Academy

• Robert Schub, University of Nebraska, Lincoln