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In the movie WarGames, a 1980s teenager hacks into a U.S. nuclear control program and almost starts a nuclear war. This movie has become a common illustration for the dangers of increasingly digitized nuclear arsenals and reflects what many scholars and practitioners see as the most perilous implication of the rise of cyberattacks--instability to states' nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) architecture. Research conducted during the Cold War suggested that even the threat of serious vulnerabilities to states' NC3 could incentivize preemptive launches of nuclear weapons. Despite this widespread concern about the destabilizing effects of NC3 vulnerabilities, there is almost no empirical research to support these conclusions. In order to solve this problem, this paper uses an experimentally-designed war game to explore the role that vulnerabilities and exploits within a hypothetical NC3 architecture play in decisions to use nuclear weapons. The game, which uses 4-6 players to simulate a national security cabinet, includes three treatment scenarios and one control scenario with no vulnerabilities or exploits. Players are randomized into the scenario groups and games are played over the course of six months in four different locations with a sample of foreign policy and community elite players from the U.S. and other nations. The games find that culture plays an important role in the impact of cyber vulnerabilities and that players across demographics tend to underestimate the effects of vulnerabilities. Together, these phenomenon lead to significant restraint and therefore suggest that cyber operations are less destabilizing than theories have hypothesized.