Clientelistic Party Discipline in Brazil

• In Event: Poster Session: Legislative Studies

Abstract

The conventional wisdom in comparative politics predicts weak legislative parties in Brazil due to personalistic electoral institutions. Research has found, however, that legislative leaders have centralized tremendous authority over the legislative process. No theory of legislative politics can explain this apparent contradiction. I argue that scholars have overlooked the importance of clientelism on legislators’ career incentives and party organization. I articulate a theory of clientelistic delegation in which backbenchers have incentives to delegate policy control to party leaders, relatively independent of formal political institutions. Backbenchers delegate power because clientelism makes position taking less salient, enhances the role of brokers for credit claiming, and makes party organization more oligarchical. This theory can explain the puzzle of the Brazilian case and can generalize to other countries where clientelism is pervasive.

Author

• Ivan Juca, University of Minnesota