The Origin and Inevitability of Inequality: A Model of Rousseau’s 2nd Discourse

• In Event: Normative Formal Theory

Abstract

This paper examines the ways in which social inequality can originate and spread from a starting point of equality, examining the question using theoretical resources found in Rousseau’s Second Discourse. According to Rousseau, social inequality originates from our propensity for social comparison, and spreads as a result of individuals constantly trying to increase their relative status for fear of being in the lowest status group. To examine and test the dynamics of Rousseau’s argument, I develop an agent-based model in which agents play iterated games where they have the option to either cooperate on equal terms or vie for status. The structure of this interaction, I argue, is comparable (though not identical) to a three-person Prisoner’s Dilemma, where defection offers status gain for individuals while imposing externalities on other players. Basic parameters, which are held fixed across tests, are tested via parameter sweeps. Non-basic parameters, such as the number of agents who prefer status to wealth and agents’ trade-off rates between status and wealth, are tested after the basic parameters are fixed. A number of significant results arise. First, in every case tested a status hierarchy among agents emerged. Second, interaction between high status and low status agents was characteristically exploitative. High status agents unilaterally defect (play for status gain) against low status agents, and low status agents cooperate (opt out of pursuing status) in response. Low status agents thus bear the burdens of the gains of high status agents, and reply by cooperating with high status agents. The model thus demonstrates how from an equal initial starting point cooperative interaction among agents can lead to the emergence of hierarchy and exploitative interaction.

Author

• Alexander Motchoulski, University of Arizona