Losing the Surprise: The Costs of Centralizing Authority in Rebel Organizations

• In Event: Rebel Institutions and Interests

Abstract

Being unpredictable is a rebel organization's greatest military asset. The inconsistent use of tactics lies at the heart of keeping a domestic audience terrorized and a security apparatus guessing. However, rebel organizations tend to use tactics consistently (i.e., in a predictable, routine-like fashion) rather than inconsistently (varying their usage). This article explores why. Using a longitudinal survey from Afghanistan, I first demonstrate that civilians are responsive to the inconsistent use of tactics by an armed group. When organizations select tactics and targets seemingly at random, civilian perceptions of security diminish. I then show that governments are more likely to negotiate with organizations that are tactically inconsistent. Governments are forced to stretch limited security resources when countering multiple threat domains. I contend that both these audience and strategic factors generate pressure for governments to resolve the conflict, increasing the likelihood that a rebel organization will enter into negotiations with and gain concessions from the state.

Given the benefits of being unpredictable, why do most rebel organizations tend to be consistent in their tactic and targeting decisions? I argue that tactical consistency is a byproduct of institutionalization. As rebel organizations begin to institutionalize and authority becomes more centralized, organizations tend toward the routine usage of tactics and target types. In essence, rebel organizations develop tactical playbooks that they then adhere to and specialize over time. Any disruption in this institutionalization process (e.g., due to leadership decapitation) temporarily (or permanently) decentralizes operational decision-making. In these contexts, tactical inconsistency becomes more prevalent as subordinates gain agency in tactical decision-making. 

The article contributes to the literature on violent organizations by highlighting an inherent limitation to institutionalization: as organizations centralize authority, they grow increasingly more predictable.  The work points to nonlinearities in the relationship between institutionalization and success.  Weakly institutionalized organizations fail to mobilize the resources necessary to wage an effective campaign, yet well-institutionalized organizations become rigid and predictable. Thus, rebel organizations are most effective when they are somewhat institutionalized but mostly decentralized. The results of the study point to a policy paradox: the more rebel organizations resemble firms, the easier it is for governments to dismantle them; however, in dismantling, governments create conditions that make organizations more inconsistent, and thus, more effective at achieving their aims.  

Author

• Eric Thomas Dunford, Georgetown University