When do Welfare Beneficiaries Demand Better Services? Evidence from Mumbai

• In Event: Public Goods Provision in Urban Areas: Evidence from South Asian Cities

Abstract

Much has been written about politicians' strategies for the allocation of public goods and services in cities in developing countries, such as India. But what motivates citizens to demand improvements to non-exclusive services? I argue that receiving government benefits increases demands for service improvement because 1) recipients will want to improve services related to the distribution and value of the benefits; and 2) beneficiaries also form a natural constituency among whom the costs of organization may be lower. I investigate this claim through an 834 household survey of winners and applicants to a low-income housing lottery in Mumbai, India. Winners are more likely than non- winners to demand that the government take responsibility for items that will increase home values, such as water, safety/law and order, electricity, and sanitation. Winners also possess more knowledge about local politics and report taking action to make these demands. Increases in reported action occur not only among owner-occupiers, but also among landlords who do not move into the new homes. Finally, I show that in cities with bureaucratic systems for addressing complaints, citizen demands can be sufficient for improving the quality of service delivery. The study sheds light on the demand for public services and the non-electoral political effects of welfare policies in developing countries.

Author

• Tanu Kumar, University of California, Berkeley