When Do Armed Groups Refuse to Carry Out Electoral Violence?

• In Event: Armed Groups and Elections

Abstract

Recent studies have found that collusion between politicians and armed groups is a common form of election violence. Yet while armed groups carry out electoral violence for politicians in some places and times, elsewhere they turn down their overtures. This paper adds to a growing literature on election-related violence by asking: when do armed groups refuse to carry out electoral violence for politicians? While allying with politicians can infuse armed groups with money, weapons, and political cover, these alliances also expose armed groups to co-optation and the loss of autonomy. I find that armed groups divided by internal factions are more likely to collude with politicians than those which are not. Leaders of internal factions accept money and arms from politicians to try to eliminate their competitors, signal their superior resources, and rally group members to their side, and in exchange, carry out electoral violence for their backers. As internal disputes are resolved through the victory of one faction over another or organizational splits, armed groups break their alliances with politicians. The paper draws on comparative case studies from Nigeria: the Ijaw Youth Council in Rivers State, the National Union of Road Transport Workers in Oyo State, and the O’odua People’s Congress in Lagos State. Evidence includes local news media and NGO reports, election observer reports, a rich anthropological literature, and semi-structured interviews conducted during fieldwork. The findings advance our understanding of patterns of election-related violence and contribute to the larger study of armed politics.

Author

• Megan Turnbull, University of Georgia