An Electoralist Model of Portfolio Allocation and Coalition Formation

• In Event: Poster Session: Comparative Politics I

Abstract

This paper proposes a model of parliamentary government formation which relies only on office-seeking parties and electoral uncertainty to generate predictions for all (minority, minimum-winning, and oversized) coalition types. This approach allows us to relax the policy-motivated assumptions of previous models, while generating testable results that produce possible allocations of cabinet posts as well as the diversity of government types we observe empirically. In addition to parsimony, abstracting away from policy motivations allows us to generate more refined insights about to the forces driving each coalition type. In the presence of reshuffling costs, Formateurs will make portfolio offers to parties based on how the status quo allocation of legislative seats compare to potential future allocations, and parties’ expectations about their own immediate electoral fortunes were elections to take place in the near future.

Author

• Alejandro Medina, Texas A&M University