Foreign Aid and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Evidence from Uganda

• In Event: Foreign Aid and Domestic Politics in Recipient Countries

Abstract

Foreign aid often accounts for a large portion of government budgets in poor, post-conflict countries and therefore represents a significant resource for political actors to attempt to use for their strategic goals. When implemented effectively, foreign aid can bolster effective reconstruction (e.g. Girod 2012, 2015), which is critical for avoiding the outbreak of renewed violence. Alternatively, a growing body of evidence suggests that foreign aid is often misused and directed by governments not towards constituencies based on need but rather primarily according to their electoral payoff for the incumbent (e.g. Jablonski 2014). For many weak post-conflict governments, the allocation of aid is important for consolidating control on both dimensions. How do post-conflict rulers strategically influence the subnational allocation of aid? This question has been relatively understudied at the subnational level but has important consequences for aid policy and reconstruction, as well as the persistence of violence and political control.

In this paper I argue that in contrast to straightforward political models of aid in other developing countries, the role of aid in post-conflict settings is complicated by the nature of aid allocated by donors for reconstruction related functions. Post-conflict aid projects often are less fungible with respect to both geography and function than aid projects in non-conflict settings. In many countries and conflicts, fighting is concentrated in geographic areas and post-conflict aid programs may be designed with geographic constraints in order to target the communities most affected by conflict. If corruption is limited and projects are implemented successfully, this kind of aid program can prevent central governments from redirecting aid towards other areas of the country for political reasons.

To test this argument, I analyze geo-located data on aid projects in Uganda since 1986. I find that constituencies with higher stocks of conflict events and fatalities have been targeted with higher levels of aid relative to peaceful constituencies throughout the post-war period. Yet, electoral politics still plays an important role in aid allocation as well. Unlike most political economy models of aid allocation, during this period in Uganda aid commitments are disproportionately targeted towards opposition constituencies. However, aid disbursements are instead disproportionately targeted towards core constituencies. This finding is consistent with qualitative evidence that corruption and weak implementation capacity have reduced the effectiveness of aid in Uganda’s reconstruction process.

Author

• David Dow, Duke University