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One of the defining features of political realism is its criticism of idealist moralism as a source of instability, hypocrisy, and delusion in politics. But whether morality is construed as a hindrance or a threat is significant, and I suggest points to two divergent, even opposed, traditions of political realism. In the realism associated very broadly with Machiavelli, moral idealism in the form of strict ethical codes and universalist morality is taken to be a severe encumbrance on the practical demands of political life. Overcoming or relaxing the norms of morality becomes necessary to cope with and contain the often-radical contingencies of politics. For twentieth-century realists, as well as in the broader range of Marxist realisms, idealist moralism is not only criticized for being ineffective but also ideological and itself a justificatory discourse of and for power, to which a kind of radical Realpolitik is the appropriate response.
A rival tradition which can been discerned in Thucydides and Hobbes, but especially in the eighteenth-century liberalism of Montesquieu, Hume, Madison, and Burke provides sober assessments of the passions, vices, and enthusiasms that drive political conflict and competition but aims to restrain and moderate rather than extol them. Here, the potential incompatibility between idealist moralism and practical politics concerns less the supposed inefficacy of moral codes in politics than the ways in which absolutist ethics, ideological certitude, and utopian schemes can threaten political order and lead to unrestrained uses of power.
Both traditions are committed to a psychological and motivational realism but for different reasons, and therefore differ sharply in their prescriptions. While one tradition is oriented towards moderation and restraint, the other encourages the harnessing of passion and power for securing ambitious political ends. Indeed, if we push this divide within realism further, from the perspective of Gandhi’s moderating realism, hard-edged realism may not be as realist or as consequentialist as it claims to be, itself often idealizing the political efficacy of violence.
Gandhi’s political thinking resonates strikingly with the tradition of moderating realism. But what distinguishes Gandhi’s realism from other moderating realisms is its progressivism, its ability to blend a negative, even conservative, orientation against violence with a program of direct action aimed at socio-political transformation.