State Campaign Finance and Electoral Success: Conditional on Context?

• In Event: Election Law in the States

Abstract

Are the effects of changes in state campaign finance law for candidates conditional on the professionalization of a legislature? Prior research has suggested there are differential effects between incumbent and challenger spending, with there being lower diminishing marginal returns for challengers. However, this relationship has not been explored across varying legislative institutional formats. We hypothesize that the greater stakes associated with professional legislatures (e.g., benefits, resources) incentivize candidates to fundraise more. As a result, campaign finance legislation constrains challengers more so in these races relative to challengers in less professionalized contexts. We test this by leveraging variation in state campaign contribution limits from 1996-2016 to examine electoral outcomes for both challengers and incumbents. Utilizing a series of synthetic control models, we construct counterfactual states and find that state campaign finance restrictions bear significant consequences for the electoral hopes of challengers in professional legislatures.

Authors

• Colin Emrich, George Washington University

• Alexander Beck, George Washington University