The Strategic Logic of African Input Subsidies: RPOs and Politicians

• In Event: The Political Economy of Economic Diversification

Abstract

This paper explores the distributive politics of contemporary fertilizer subsidy programs in sub-Saharan Africa. I argue that rural producer organizations (agricultural coops, farmers associations, farmer clubs, etc.) bargain with national politicians, exchanging political support for pro-producer policies such as fertilizer subsidies. As Africa grows more democratic, politicians are increasingly reliant on electoral mechanisms for sustaining rule. Rural communities use rural institutions such as rural producer organizations to form blocs of voters, which they use to collectively bargain for better policy. Using survey data from nearly 35,000 households in 7 African countries, I analyze my theory against conventional logics of distributive politics that focus on core supporters, swing voters and co-ethnics. I find a consistent, positive relationship exists between rural producer organizations and fertilizer subsidies, while other theories of distributive politics perform poorly across all surveyed countries.

Author

• Brian Engelsma, University of California, San Diego