Political Assassinations

• In Event: Armed Groups and Elections

Abstract

Politicians are never safe, even in consolidated democracies. Existing literature shows evidence that political violence tends to rise around elections. However, most studies address violence towards voters and few focus on violence targeted specifically toward state actors. In this project, I introduce assassinations as a strategy to win elections and an efficient alternative to continual graft and corruption. Drawing on theories of conflict and corruption, I explain what conditions affect the likelihood of violence against state officials. Decisions to kill an enemy are made based on the marginal benefit of bribing and on the costs of violence. Killing political opponents may be an attractive strategy for politicians when the benefits of office-holding and the stakes of losing the election are high and weak institutions render the expected costs of punishment low. This expectation is evaluated empirically using original data on assassinations in Brazil in the 1996-2016 period. I demonstrate that under limited law enforcement, different actors use violence to increase economic rents and signal their political strength. Thus, I introduce assassinations as an alternative strategy to maintain political power in weakly institutionalized settings.

Author

• Mariana Carvalho, University of California, San Diego