A Model of Electoral Accountability and Bureaucracy

• In Event: Agency and Accountability

Abstract

In many theories of electoral accountability, voters learn about an incumbent’s quality through the observation of policy outcomes. Yet, politicians rely on bureaucracies to implement most policies. In comparative perspective, variation in bureaucratic capacity for policy implementation shapes politicians’ ability to influence policy outcomes. How does variation in bureaucratic quality influence voters’ ability to select politicians? Does such variation affect a politician's strategy for allocating funds to public goods provision? To answer these questions, I embed a bureaucrat that implements policy in a model of electoral accountability. Preliminary results suggest that limited bureaucratic capacity deters a politician that would otherwise invest in public goods from making these investments. This reduces both public goods provision as well as voters’ ability to discern politician type. The results provide provides new explanations for broad empirical patterns observed in low- and middle-income democracies including incumbency (dis)advantage, levels of corruption, and uneven levels of service provision.

Author

• Tara L Slough, Columbia University