The Political Economy of the Philippines Drug War

• In Event: Budgets, Bribes, and Local Political Survival

Abstract

Over the past ten years, methamphetamine production, trafficking and usage in Asia has skyrocketed, with crystal meth seizures increasing by more than 500% from 2008 to 2017 (UNODC). Although historically centered on the ‘golden triangle’ of Myanmar, Laos and Thailand, the drug now known as ‘shabu’ is manufactured throughout East and Southeast Asia. Illegal in every ASEAN country, meth is closely linked with shadowy and often violent smuggling and distribution networks. Crime syndicates are regarded to have penetrated state institutions, from local police to the customs services in border areas throughout the region.

Governments in the region have primarily responded using violent crackdowns against smugglers, distributors and even users. Replicating what has become known in El Salvador in the 1990s as the ‘Mano Dura’ (iron fist) approach, these police-led clearing operations are intended to beat back drug trafficking networks and give confidence to law-abiding citizens. Severe drug crimes are liable for capital punishment in most ASEAN countries -- in recent years traffickers and distributors have been executed in Myanmar, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines. Although primarily carried out through formal state processes, vigilantism and extrajudicial killings are on the rise.

Since July 2016, the Philippines under the Rodrigo Duterte government has carried out the most intense and high profile nationwide meth crackdown known as “Operation Double Barrel” (ODB). Moving beyond aggressive prosecution of drug crimes, Duterte has encouraged members of the public to participate in anti-drug enforcement, including using violence. The death toll during the past two and half years is estimated to be at least 5,000 and possibly as high as 27,000 (source).

We take advantage of two sources of exogenous variation -- close elections for mayor and random rotation of police chief -- to answer two main questions. First when and why do mayors and police chiefs prosecute drug crackdowns more or less aggressively? We expect to show that politically aligned mayors (pro-Duterte) make the municipal police engage more aggressively in ODB and as do police chiefs who showed a predilection for 'iron fist' technique before Duterte's election. Second, how does the policy impact social, economic and political outcomes -- do we find evidence for the 'broken windows' hypothesis of drug crackdowns? Our prior is that ODB on average probably did not reduce non-drug crime, corruption, small business registration or non-violent drug-related morbidity. We expect the crackdown to reduce public approval for the President among lower income respondents, but not high income respondents.

Authors

• Renard J. Sexton, Emory University

• Dotan A Haim, Dartmouth College

• Nico Ravanilla, University of California San Diego