The Rise of Non-Linear Warfare: Achieving Political Objectives without War

• In Event: Emerging Norms in International Security

Abstract

The world has seen the number of interstate wars drop over the past few decades, yet interstate power struggles remain. Instead of resorting to war as a tool to achieve political objectives, some countries are expanding the use of Non-Linear Warfare (NLW) techniques. The ideas behind these types of operations are not new to warfare, but they have evolved with the advent of social media, digital banking, rising populist movements in Europe and America, increased economic interdependence around the globe, and the hegemony of the United States military. Hence, states using non-linear techniques tend not to have the capabilities to force through their objectives, but instead must wait for an occasion of weakness to exploit. For example, the chaos surrounding the Euromaidan protests opened a door for Russia to take aggressive non-linear action in Ukraine. If opportunities like the Euromaidan do not materialize on their own to provide the setting for non-linear operations, then aggressors may apply other NLW measures over time to create the setting for more forceful tactics. These other methods can include the use of social media and fake newscasts to cause unrest or confusion. Furthermore, using these modes of media can amplify the divisions in a country already created by populist movements. This is why the world will see an increase to non-linear warfare tactics and continue to see interstate conflict as an unviable option in the near term.
The concept of “non-linear” describes that the conflict does not have clear front lines. Non-linear warfare relies on the subversion and division of the enemy’s social and political structure allowing the aggressor to do their will by any means, without the need of brute force. Non-linear warfare employs many measures that would not seem like warfare although the goal, as in all war, is to force the enemy to do your will. In NLW, instead of tanks leading a breakthrough at the front; propaganda, political and social agitators, and cyberattacks take their place. This does not mean kinetic action or hard tactics remain unutilized. Russia’s “little green men” in Crimea or Russian military support for the pro-Russian combatants in Eastern Ukraine provide prime examples of these harder tactics. The key in using these approaches in NLW revolves around making it unclear what is going on. Again, when the “little green men” first appeared, no one could confirm what they were there to do or who sent them. Non-linear warfare also applies pressures on an enemy to weaken their resolve against any forceful contestation and to make any decision to act impossible because of the heightened state of unknowns. Generally, the pressures focus on the core vital functions of a society and look to undermine them. This includes all measures taken to undermine a nation’s government to cause it to lose the general support of the people. In this manner of conflict, the rise of populist movements has proven to be divisive within nations and international organizations like NATO or the EU. This impacts the ability of these nations to strengthen their collective security, especially against non-linear tactics.
These operations not always need an established plan of attacks; rather, they compose a form of warfare where offensives take place if a chance presents itself. It is near impossible to plan for every type of non-linear operation and thus a state must stand ever watchful and ready to react quickly not only to military threats, but also in other arenas such as cyber, economic, information, social, etc. Over time, non-linear methods try to put the aggressor in a position of strength, not necessarily with military buildup, but rather by a campaign that undermines the other state’s legitimacy to its population and decreases the morale of its armed forces. This may lead to internal fracture within a state facing the non-linear campaign without the need for large-scale military operations by the aggressor.
The overall objective of a state engaging in NLW is the wearing down of the enemy socially, politically, and militarily. A successful non-linear campaign will leave the defending state in one of the following conditions. First, they will not have the political will to fight and thus leave the aggressor to do their will. Second, the conventional forces have been diminished and alliances divided to a point where the defensive state could be defeated on the battlefield. Third, the defensive state simply acquiesced to just the threat of force. Finally, the defensive state becomes indifferent to the aggressor’s operations and allows them to act at their will without interference. That is the end game in NLW - conducting operations to allow the freedom of maneuver for the aggressor’s plan.

Author

• Tad Schnaufer, University of Central Florida