From Rebels to Politicians: Albanian Rebel Successor Parties in the Balkans

• In Event: States, Local Communities and Informal Institutions in Eastern Europe and Russia

Abstract

When do rebel groups transform into successful political parties? This paper develops a new theory of rebel successor party electoral success that centers on wartime rebel-civilian ties and rebel organizational cohesion. I hypothesize that the structure of rebel-civilian linkages, as shaped by levels of recruitment and territorial control, generates different structural conditions for post-war electoral support for rebel successor parties. When rebels recruit more from the civilian population during the conflict or when they control more territory where civilians live, they are more likely to have a broad base of party members and loyalists to mobilize immediately after the conflict is over. I also argue, however, that the ability of rebel successor parties to preserve and expand their wartime bases of social support is crucially affected by wartime rebel organizational cohesion. The more cohesive the former rebels, the better suited they are to sustain the post-conflict changes to their organizational infrastructure and adapt successfully to the demands and challenges of political party building and electoral battle. I theorize two key mechanisms that link rebel cohesion to party success. First, cohesive rebel organizations are better positioned to preserve their wartime social bases by avoiding rebel leader splits and defections to other political parties. Second, cohesive rebel groups are better able to appeal to electorates outside their immediate bases of social support by recruiting non-rebel political elites into their ranks and formulating political programs that appeal to non-combatant voters.

The paper then tests these theoretical predictions using comparative historical analyses across a small set of carefully selected cases. Specifically, I analyze all of the ethnic Albanian rebel organizations in the Balkans and their post-conflict political fortunes as rebel successor parties. The advantages of this approach are manifold. Focusing on every ethnic Albanian rebel organization in the Balkans ensures that the cases are not “cherry-picked.” The examination of similar cases from the same time-period allows me to control for multiple factors, such as the cleavage over which the insurgencies were fought (ethnic armed conflicts), the technology of rebellion (irregular warfare), shared type of rebel successor party family (ethnic parties), common history of political development (post-communist democracies), similar electoral systems (proportional representation voting systems), similar levels of post-conflict inter-party competition, and presence of external actors in the post-conflict setting. I am therefore able to conduct well-controlled and contextualized comparisons that utilize rich and varied empirical sources to establish correlation and identify the precise mechanisms linking cause and effect. The paper also evaluates the possibility that other factors, which are not highlighted by my theory but are mentioned by alternative explanations, can explain the outcomes observed in these cases.

The empirical material utilized is diverse. I rely heavily on journalistic sources and reports published by international organizations. I also use published summaries of focus group findings, published and unpublished memoirs by domestic actors, internal party documents, as well as existing empirical literature, particularly historical sources. In addition to these written sources, I conducted over 70 interviews in Kosovo, Macedonia, and South Serbia. These include interviews with former militants from all three rebel groups, politicians, party workers, academics, international organization representatives, civil society activists, journalists, and state security service officials. The interviews are particularly helpful to understand the internal workings of rebel organizations and their successor parties.

Explaining the political transition of former rebel organizations and their post-conflict electoral performance has serious policy and theoretical implications. Fighting with ballots may be a strategic substitute for fighting with bullets and electoral concerns can shape the decision of rebel groups to end fighting. Moreover, the successful political transformation of armed groups is deemed a crucial prerequisite for the survival of peace settlements. In addition, scholars have found that the distribution of electoral support for rebels can affect patterns of electoral violence and that their electoral performance has a lasting impact on the quality of democracy as well as the degree and nature of party competition. The analysis of the performance of former rebel organizations in postwar elections therefore informs broader theoretical questions about conflict resolution and post-conflict peace duration, the political legacies of civil wars, the development of party organizations and institutionalization of party systems, and ethnic party politics and electoral violence in general.

Author

• Pellumb Kelmendi, Auburn University