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The goal of this study is to understand what influenced the spread of state-level mandatory sentencing reforms across the United States during the 2000s. The cause of these governmental decisions, as well as non-decisions by those states that have either not attempted reform or failed at passage of reform, is an important question related to the public policy process. The following research questions are explored: Do states which were early adopters of mandatory minimum sentencing reform differ from late adopters on classically discussed drivers of policy diffusion, such as geographic proximity or political affiliation? Here, two diffusion mechanisms, normative pressure and imitation (Berry & Berry, 2014), are tested. Normative pressure is operationalized by political affiliation while imitation is operationalized by geographic proximity.
Using a dataset built by the author using existing data available on variables such as political party of the governor, geographic region, and year mandatory reform was adopted (if adoption occurred in the state), an event history analysis (EHA) was used. The preliminary findings indicate the only significant predictor of length of time to reform in a state is having a Democratic governor. This is interesting due to the history of mandatory sentencing reform, as many bipartisan efforts took off in the early 2000s (labeled the Justice Reinvestment Initiative). Actors who were previously strong proponents of mandatory sentences, such as conservative lawmakers and the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), became more accepting of efforts to reform these sentencing policies in light of rising costs and evidence of ineffectiveness. Therefore, this finding regarding Democratic governors is interesting, as it appears to contradict this bipartisan movement.
In order to gain a more nuanced understanding of the EHA findings, several in-depth qualitative case studies of states are undertaken. Makse and Volden (2011) point out the importance of specific policy characteristics when doing a diffusion study. Thus, this study adds a secondary analysis to examine the differences in proposed policies by state more closely, which may have had an impact on passage or failure of reform. This analysis may also help explain the findings of why Democratic governance matters for reform despite claims of bipartisan efforts. These qualitative case studies of several states with different years of reform across the diffusion timeline, as well as several where reform was not attempted or failed, may additionally illuminate questions of interest to policy process scholars, such as the structure of interest group mobilization (see, for example, Birkland, 1998) as there are many active interest groups in this context, both for and against mandatory sentencing reform.
This study is also very relevant to the APSA topic of “Populism and Privilege.” Scholars have discussed the concept of “penal populism.” Other terms used for this are “culture of control” and “populist punitiveness” (Garland, 2001; Pratt, 2007; Smith, 2010; Tonry, 2004). This generally relates to the belief that there is a movement among the public of declining trust in governmental institutions and thus, a propensity to support harsh punishment policies (Hutton, 2005). In this context, the presence of penal populism would lead to opposition of mandatory sentencing reforms. Although this movement was labeled in the 1990s among the “tough on crime” era in the United States (Smith, 2010), there is still a continuing movement against reform of mandatory sentences, despite evidence their effects are detrimental (Mauer & Huling, 1995; Mauer & King, 2007; Mustard, 2001; Roberts, 2004; Schlesinger, 2011). This is explored more in the case studies, as there may be a backlash by the public occurring amidst the reform diffusion process.