Why Do Substate Actors Undertake Unilateral Climate Mitigation?

• In Event: Global Commitment to Addressing Climate Change

Abstract

Unilateral efforts by substate actors (SSAs) like cities, states, or provinces to reduce local carbon emissions appear irrational: such unilateral efforts cannot substantially impact the global carbon load unless enacted as part of a global effort to reduce emissions, and SSAs do not have the authority to engage directly in diplomatic efforts to ensure that a concerted global effort takes place, e.g. through an enforceable agreement. Yet many SSAs have nonetheless passed ambitious and costly emissions reduction measures unilaterally. Such cases challenge the classic expectation that public goods efforts are unlikely under anarchic conditions when actors cannot expect to capture direct private benefits from such efforts. This project asks why SSAs undertake such unilateral efforts. Four possible justifications suggest themselves: 1) aligned private goods: SSAs engage in unilateral emissions reduction because local private interests - such as renewable equipment manufacturers - benefit directly from such policy regardless of whether global emissions reduction occurs; 2) ideology: SSAs engage in emissions reductions because policymakers or constituents adhere to beliefs such as environmentalism that dictate such actions; 3) coercion: SSAs engage in emissions reduction because they are subjected to pressure or coercive force from other actors, sovereign or SSA; 4) exercise of influence: SSAs engage in emissions reduction because doing so provides them with paradiplomatic opportunities to interface with other jurisdictions and pursue geostrategic goals on a separate track from national governments. Using a representative set of cases drawn from SSAs pursuing unilateral emissions reduction across global regions, I use semi-structured interviews with policy actors, archival research, and comparative quantitative data collection to assess the evidence for each of these hypotheses.

Author

• Nina Kelsey, George Washington University