The Cooptation and Coercion of Religion in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam

• In Event: Authoritarianism in Southeast Asian Politics

Abstract

This paper examines the dynamic historical relationship between the state, authoritarian regimes, and organized religion in the three ostensibly Marxist states of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Despite sharing an ideological commitment toward curbing the influence of religion domestically, actual regime policies toward these groups have varied both temporally and geographically. I argue that the explanation for this difference can be found through unpacking the strength of each regime’s state apparatus. Specifically, this paper introduces a new typological theory for understanding how state capacity has shaped the actual strategies Lao, Cambodian, and Vietnamese regimes have employed to manage organized religion since 1975. In brief, I argue that regimes in states featuring high degrees of bureaucratic power have successfully co-opted important religious figures through political and financial patronage. Conversely, regimes lacking access to a powerful bureaucratic toolkit have demonstrated a clear tendency to apply haphazard coercive strategies against prominent religious figures (ranging from extrajudicial killings to incarceration and physical threats).

My findings strongly suggest that the main reason regimes in Laos and Cambodia post-1975 initially resorted to violence-despite numerous attempts to regulate Buddhism through official channels-stems from a legacy of weak bureaucratic state development. Conversely, Vietnamese regimes since the end of the Second Indochina War have mobilized a growing bureaucracy to effectively co-opt domestic Buddhist and Catholic organizations respectively. Through a comparative historical case study methodology and a Most Similar Systems Design, this paper integrates primary source material obtained through grant-funded research at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, data from the Association for Religious Data Archives, and secondary literature from Comparative Politics, Religious Studies, and Sociology to better understand the complex relationship between the state, authoritarian regimes, and religious organizations in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam.

The different historical approaches to religious organizations alluded to in each of the above cases deserve some preliminary attention. In Laos, Marxist revolutionaries quickly saw the Buddhist monkhood as a disruptive alternative locus of power. Initially, the Pathet Lao regime pursued coercive policies against monks, including the occupation of monasteries and forced re-education programs. Over time, successive Lao regimes have shown greater reluctance to crackdown against prominent religious figures, fearing reprisal from both citizens and competing elites. Instead, policies of deliberate accommodation are indicative of a regime lacking the bureaucratic resources required to effectively co-opt politically minded monks into compliance. In the Lao case, regime-sponsorship of Buddhism signals an attempt to garner popular legitimacy in an otherwise underperforming state.

In Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge’s (1975-79) brutal campaign against its own citizens resulted in the near extermination of the Buddhist monkhood and the eventual destruction of the state. In the decades since, both the Vietnamese-sponsored and Hun Sen regimes have taken a far more cautious approach to managing Cambodia’s monkhood. As in Laos, Cambodian regimes since the Khmer Rouge have been compelled to grant the monkhood greater autonomy in its affairs because it cannot control religious organizations through normal bureaucratic channels.

In contrast, since the end of the Second Indochina War, Vietnam has constructed and mobilized a strong bureaucratic state apparatus to organize and control the political behavior of Buddhist monks and Catholic clergy alike. State-controlled religion monitored through an extensive surveillance system provides the communist party with the leverage to selectively punish individual actors without having to resort to costly crackdowns. This management strategy has allowed Vietnam to pursue its desired policies while minimizing threats to regime legitimacy.

Divergent policies toward religion across these nominally-Marxist regimes demonstrate that not all authoritarian regimes are equipped with the resources required to execute policies that align with their ideological preferences. Instead, authoritarian regimes in weak states must weigh the political costs of applying coercive force against symbolically-powerful religious figures. In strong states, this sort of calculation is often unnecessary as the regime already has access to bureaucratic resources required to effectively surveil and co-opt important religious actors. While much has been written regarding the behavior of religious groups in authoritarian contexts, this research breaks new ground in understanding how state capacity shapes the range of strategies available to authoritarian regimes as they interact with and seek to contain symbolically-important religious figures.

Author

• Adam Howe, Fairfield University