The Causes of Military Populism: Analyzing Thai Military Regimes, 1958-2019

• In Event: Authoritarianism in Southeast Asian Politics

Abstract

Why do some military dictatorships pursue populist policies while eschew such platforms? Do these juntas start out as populist or do they change tack some time during their tenure? Why do these regimes alter course? What explains the timing of the armed forces’ populist turn? This paper examines these questions and offers a theory to explain the origins of military populism. Populism here refers to the reaction to a deep sense of crisis (perceived or real), by appealing to ‘the people’ who perceive themselves as betrayed or wronged. Recent work has studied this populist turn largely from the actions of individuals, political parties or social movements, and within the context of consolidated liberal democracies or democratically back-sliding countries. Noticeably overlooked is the practice of populism in authoritarian regimes, particularly that of military dictatorships. Scholars of civil-military relations have also discounted the prospect that military rulers could turn populist, arguing instead that armed forces disdain mass politics, preferring instead hierarchical, antipolitical and managerial-technical outlooks. The study analyzes Thailand’s military regimes – Sarit (1958-1963); Thanom (1963-1973); Kriangsek (1977-1980); Prem (1980-1988); Prayut (2014-present). The Sarit and present-day Prayut regimes’ populist outlook – including current populist policies of cash handouts, loans-subsidies, the relaxation of laws for the consumption of marijuana and the impending legislation to legalize same-sex unions – stand in contrast to the other more bureaucratic-technocratic military dictatorships. The essay tests the theory on the origins and development of populism in the Sarit and Prayut regimes.

Author

• Terence C. Lee, National University of Singapore