Contests, Factions, and Party Organization

• In Event: Agency and Accountability

Abstract

We study the internal organization of political parties as the solution of a moral hazard problem between a party principal and two factions. Factional effort increases the party’s chances in a general election—the leader’s objective—, as well as the faction’s standing within the party, which we model as the probability of winning an internal contest. A party’s internal organization is a system of contingent prizes, i.e., how much of a faction’s share of the spoils of office depends on the internal contest. We study how the party principal’s choice of prizes depends on the competitive environment, such as the electoral system proportionality. We document an inverse relationship between the intensity of the inter-party competition and the severity of the intra-party competition. Winner-take-all systems produce relatively small prizes and mild factional competition. Conversely, factional competition in consensual systems features large prizes, thereby triggering a winner-take-all competition between factions. Our result helps to rationalize observed dispersion in party organizational structure.

Authors

• Giovanna Invernizzi, Columbia University

• Carlo Prato, Columbia University