Populist and Authoritarian Referendums: Cross-regional Comparisons

• In Event: Electoral Rule Reforms and Mistakes

Abstract

Referendums are often seen as a tool that empowers populist authoritarians. Globally, democratic backsliding has coincided with increased use of popular votes. However, any relationship between democratic deconsolidation and rising numbers of referendums is often asserted without being explored. It is not clear whether referendums are an effective mechanism of choice for illiberal leaders.

This paper looks at whether populists and authoritarians are actually using referendums to try to extend their power and rid themselves of liberal constraints. Are referendums associated with the rolling back of liberal institutions or the advance of populist policy agendas? Are referendums used to advance executive authority or bypass representative bodies? Using a mixed methods approach, this paper will seek to identify whether populists and authoritarians are likely to use direct democracy in the process of advancing illiberalism and highlight patters through selective case studies.

Turkey and Mexico provide examples of how would-be authoritarians can use referendums to undermine liberal democracy. In Turkey, systemic changes to liberal institutions and practices have been punctuated by constitutional alterations enacted through referendums. In Mexico, recent popular consultations have been staged to legitimate the policy preferences of the new president. Despite poor organization and dismal turnout for the consultas, the Mexican administration has used these votes as permission to take a series of controversial actions. These cases demonstrate arch-typical ways referendums could undermine democracy, gradually rolling back liberal institutions and bypassing the legislature. Do these examples highlight a pattern of populist authoritarians use of direct democracy? Are there regional commonalities and contrasts that correspond to differing historical experience with populist politics?

In Europe, states with longstanding traditions of organizing national referendums, like France, Italy, and Ireland do also have strong populist movements. However, recent growth in European populism has taken place in states that have less direct democracy. Moreover, Brexit aside, referendums have been largely ineffective mechanisms for European populists to make systemic change or enact controversial policies. Voters and institutional constraints have helped to limit the impact of populist referendums. In Africa, referendums have played a critical role in advancing electoral authoritarianism, in particular by extending presidential terms and eliminating term limits. African referendums in transitions toward authoritarianism have passed with high levels of voter approval. Latin American experience reflects both the African authoritarian attempts to extend presidential terms and authority and the European limitations imposed by voters and institutional constrains. There is a mixed record of the use of referendums to entrench or resist authoritarianism.

Direct democracy is increasingly a normal feature of healthy democratic systems, rather than a bug that endangers liberalism. Referendums may function as a part of the system of institutional checks and balances that maintain liberal order, or they can undermine it. Central to distinguishing between these roles are the institutional constraints on referendums and the political context in which they are deployed.

Author

• Katherine Collin, Georgetown University