Readapting Ian Shapiro's Conception of Domination

• In Event: Poster Session: Normative Political Theory

Abstract

Is it possible to curb potentially avoidable abuses of power through the way we conceptualize domination? The literature on domination is vast and the attempts to define it are plenty. In this paper, I critique Shapiro’s Politics Against Domination; and I argue that his definition of domination is inconsistent with the objectives of his political model for two reasons: 1) it cannot sufficiently prevent domination stemming from morally-problematic power structures; 2) it does not consider how a power asymmetry in the moment may be a function of instances of domination from the past that may have gone undetected for a wide range of reasons including the lack of an obvious perpetrator or the absence of a motive to dominate.

My paper offers a way to reconcile deficiencies in Shapiro’s account by theorizing an important distinction between the unique functions of a priori and a posteriori conceptions of domination. In presenting a normative adaptation of Shapiro’s conception, I attempt to demonstrate how an incorporation of this epistemological distinction can serve Shapiro’s objectives.

The difficulty with Shapiro’s terms rests primarily upon his rejection of Phillip Pettit’s broader definition of domination. To Shapiro, potential domination is not to be confused with actual domination. But this limited definition leaves avenues for subtle domination perpetrated by the political system overtime and by the various institutions that it oversees to slip through the cracks. The normative objectives of his theory require an expanded definition that can anticipate and prevent power abuses before they occur.

An a priori conception of domination may curb potential abuses of power before they occur by informing legislative systems that design and reform institutions, laws, and policies. An a posteriori conception of domination, on the other hand, serves to combat actual abuses of power through various investigative and judicial functions. Though Shapiro sufficiently treats the a posteriori functions in his account, he does so without recognizing its important epistemic distinction with a priori functions.

Shapiro’s lack of attention to the functions of an a priori conception of domination, coupled with his rejection of Pettit’s wider definition, leaves his democratic model susceptible to recurring and often-unintentional instances of systemic domination that could have been prevented. Readapting Shapiro’s conception of domination to incorporate a priori and a posteriori epistemological distinctions can reconcile the need to prevent domination stemming from potentially problematic power structures without preemptively punishing its occupants for crimes they have not yet committed. By incorporating my modified definition, Shapiro’s model for a democratic political order based on a theory of nondomination becomes better situated and its prospects for practical and successful application are significantly increased.

Author

• Somia M Youssef, Duke University