Challenging Elite Persistence: Theory and Evidence from India

• In Event: Understanding Elites Views and Behaviors

Abstract

Why do elites persist? Existing theories of elite persistence focus on control over economic resources, institutional capture, social capital and the ability to transfer authority to the next generation. We argue that an undertheorized dimension of elite persistence is the inability of non-elites to coordinate and challenge existing set of elite families. Non-elites fail to do so as they fear retribution and sanction. They internalize a set of behaviour where they fail to make claims and demand sense of fair play from elites. We curated an original dataset of intermediate council elections (panchayat samiti) in all 821 blocks in a North Indian State (Uttar Pradesh) over past five election cycles to understand the underlying conditions that facilitate elite persistence. We collected additional information on social, economic and political connections of winner and runner-ups. We use this information to categorize elite families in three categories: old elites who have persisted, elites with declining status and new emerging elite. We plan to conduct a survey among these elected officials and randomly selected citizens (non-elites) in 30 blocks (10 from each category) to assess variation in personality traits and source of influence. We then intend to conduct ultimatum games with third-party punishment among the survey respondents. The study evaluates differences in proposed distributions and sanctions based on common knowledge about various players on three dimensions of elite persistence. First, under what conditions traditional elites are more or less likely to be altruistic? We assess whether traditional elites, playing as the proposer, give more equitable contribution when they face challenges from new elites. Second, do non-elites give equitable contributions when the responder is revealed to be a traditional elite? Differences in ‘money left on the table’ would indicate the relative strength of the elites. Third, we assess variation in the severity of punishment to the proposer (elites) by non-elites playing as punishers. Non-elites would give higher punishments in villages where the status of an old elite is declining.

Authors

• Pranav Gupta

• Rahul Verma, University of California, Berkeley