War Financing in Authoritarian States

• In Event: Emerging Norms in International Security

Abstract

The literature on the democratic conduct of conflict has long focused on the costs of war with an emphasis toward how casualties constrain leaders. A recent turn in the literature has shifted attention toward the financial costs of war and how war finance affects the constraints leaders face. Despite growing attention on this area, scholars have under-interrogated the role and impact of regime type in these dynamics. Authoritarian leaders must also balance competing priorities from their governing coalitions and the public. My project therefore builds on insights from regime survival literature and recent developments on the cost of war to investigate how authoritarian regimes pay for war and the relationship between war finance method and decision-making constraints. I argue that selectorate size and the composition of domestic audiences influence what financing strategy a state’s leadership prefers. I show this both with a simple formal model and using case study analysis. I trace how leaders weigh the political externalities associated with financing method against the needs of the war effort. These findings contribute both theoretically and empirically to the burgeoning literature on war financing and the conduct of conflict.

Author

• Robert Cantelmo, Cornell University