China’s Selective Escalation in the Maritime Disputes

• In Event: Dimensions of Chinese Foreign Policy

Abstract

Why has China escalated maritime disputes in the South China Sea but not in the East China Sea or Yellow Sea? Since China began its rapid economic development in the late 1980s, the rise of China has created both economic opportunities for, and security threats to, its neighbor states. As Southeast Asian states became more heavily dependent on bilateral trade with China in recent decades, the Chinese government has attempted to expand its influence in the South China Sea. The literature primarily focuses on China’s great power ambitions in East Asia as a whole. However, the puzzle of why China has not escalated its military actions in the East China Sea or Yellow Sea remains. I argue that two factors—China’s energy mercantilism (ambition to secure stable energy supplies to increase its economic and military power) and its economic leverage over Southeast Asian states—explain this variation in strategy.
Since the late 1970s, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has built up its domestic legitimacy by pointing to the country’s constant economic growth under CCP leadership. To maintain its spectacular rate of economic growth, the state needs to secure a stable energy supply and ensure continued massive exports of Chinese manufactured products. Consequently, it is critical for the government to secure the South China Sea’s sea lanes of communications (SLOCs). Moreover, a large amount of natural resources are embedded in the South China Sea. Thus, the Chinese government is extremely sensitive to any potential interruptions of these SLOCs. Unlike the South China Sea, other aforementioned maritime regions do not have such geostrategic importance for China. This geostrategic difference is further exacerbated by China’s relationships with the major claimants of the South China Sea disputes. Unlike the countries which border the East China and Yellow Seas, the claimants in disputes related to the SLOCs are extremely dependent on China’s economy, even as they are not China’s main trading partners. Due to this asymmetric trade dependence, China is less hesitant to escalate militarily in the South China Sea. China is undoubtedly aware it has great leverage in the South China Sea disputes (unlike in the other maritime regions), because any disrupted trade caused by militarized tensions would be much more damaging to the claimant states’ market than to the Chinese market.
I employed statistical analysis as well as ArcGIS spatial analysis. First, I created my original dataset with six dispute dyads involving China and its maritime neighbors between 1960 and 2015. I also developed an index evaluating China’s energy vulnerability and calculated a score for each dyad’s asymmetric trade dependence. Second, I used the ArcGIS analysis and produced a new map to show the spatial correlation between China’s escalation of military conflict and the geostrategic values of the region: proximity to the SLOCs or a large amount of natural resources. In addition, using a remote sensing from satellite photos from 2005 to 2015, I also analyzed where China has built its artificial islands in the South China Sea. Third, a multilevel logistic regression analysis with a spatial lag effect utilizing these original data supports my argument that China is more likely to escalate disputes when it experiences greater energy vulnerability against more asymmetrically dependent neighbor states in which there exist higher geostrategic values, natural resources and proximity to major oil shipping lanes.

Author

• Hye Ryeon Jang, University of Florida