Consequences of Elite Uncertainty Under Authoritarian Rule

• In Event: Autocratic Institutions and Elite Control

Abstract

Across autocracies, coup d'etat occurs at a rate that renders them commonplace when compared to other modes of ouster. Past scholarship has well established that autocrats offer concessions in the form of power and material goods to prevent ouster by their inner circle (see Bueno de Mesquita 2003, Svolik 2012, Geddes et al. 2018). Despite this proliferation of research, more work needs to be done to understand how autocrats prevent coup d'etat. This paper examines one dimension that has yet to be sufficiently addressed. Namely, it examines how the concessions offered by an autocrat are influenced by the relative uncertainty of their inner circle about remaining in that favored body. This paper formally demonstrates that an autocrat will offer fewer concessions when members of the inner circle are more uncertain about their fates post-coup than under the status quo. It also shows that authoritarian survival is more likely and democratization is less likely under these conditions. Finally, it suggests that members of an autocrat's inner circle may actually be collectively better off when their fates under the incumbent autocrat are more uncertain.

Author

• Tamar Zeilberger, University of California, Los Angeles